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- Mark N. Klett
- President & CEO
- Klett Consulting Group, INC
- mark.klett@kcg-inc.net
- 757.721.5040
- www.kcg-inc.net
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- To improve our effectiveness with less redundancy and more
synchronization requires each capability to be optimized and integrated
for the benefit of a Joint Force Mission.
- True Joint military operations will only be realized when seamless
integration of each service is accomplished: Institutionally,
Organizationally, Intellectually, and Technically.
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- “Transformation is not defined by a policy or choice. It's an inexorable
process of change. To me, it's simply fostering changes that result in a
dramatic improvement in the way a combatant commander wages war. And
such dramatic improvement requires not only technological change but
also, and perhaps most importantly, changes in how we think.” Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld, 21 May 2002
- “Transformation is a process of change that involves developing new
operational concepts, experimenting to determine which ones work and
which do not, and implementing those that do.... transformation means accelerating
the development and fielding of capabilities that we know we need...” Transformation
Study Report: Transforming Military Operations Capabilities, April 27,
2001.
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- Interoperability is an
Operational Imperative. Network Centric Operations is How we will fight
and win in this Century.
- Transformation is about Change.
Put An Organization in Charge
of Interoperability -
Resource them… and It
will get Fixed.
- JUST Do IT !!
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- Promotes stronger coordination of the Department’s Joint Battle
Management Command
and Control (BMC2) efforts
- Expands USJFCOM’s role for overseeing and directing joint BMC2
capabilities for joint
integration and interoperability
- Assigns USJFCOM oversight/directive authority for the Deployable Joint
Command and Control
(DJC2) program and Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) starting
in FY03
- Assigns USJFCOM oversight/directive authority for Family of
Interoperable Pictures (FIOP) starting
in FY04
- USJFCOM JI&I immediately assumes an expanded role for:
- Common Operational and Tactical Pictures
- Combat Identification
- Situational Awareness
- Adaptive Mission Planning and Rehearsal
- Interoperability among service intelligence systems
- Interoperable joint fires, maneuver, and intelligence
- Integrated Joint Battle Management Command and Control (BMC2)
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- Asymmetric Threats
- OUT OF ‘SYNC’ CYCLES
- Requirements, POM, Technology, Acquisition
- Demand for Rapid Integration of Technology
- Acquisition Reform
- Concept/Capabilities Based
- Spiral Development – Iterative Process
- Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (Materiel focus)
- Joint Test and Evaluation (Process focus)
- Revolution in Business and Military Affairs
- Transformation Imperative
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- DoD Leadership ‘knows’ what is needed
- TRANSFORMATION of the Military is an Operational and Fiscal Imperative.
- Requires Synchronization of Efforts across Services
- Concept Base Requirements to create Future Operational Capabilities
(FOCs)
- We are at WAR on many fronts and we must prepare to win the next war -
not the last.
- Rapid fielding of capabilities is a reality
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- Field the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) – including the
enabling concepts for developing transformational joint command and
control.
- Pursue rapid, prototyping of capabilities to improve joint warfighting
now.
- Provide actionable recommendations from experimentation results to
senior leaders to inform options for future force investments.
- Include our Combatant Commands, Services, Defense Agencies and
Multinational partners; collaborate in experimentation activities.
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- Joint National Training Capability (JNTC)
- Standing Joint Force Head Quarters (SJFHQ)
- Deployable/Distributed Joint Command & Control (DJC2)
- Interoperability Technology Demonstration Center (ITDC)
- DCEE – Distributive Collaborative Experimentation Environment
- JTEN - Joint Training and
Experimentation Network
- TENA – Test & Training Enabling Architecture
- DEP – Distributive Engineering Plant
- JDEP – Joint Distributive Engineering Plant
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- SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
July 9, 2003
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- The Plan was adaptable and flexible
- Allowed Gen Franks & team to turn difficulties into opportunities
- Example: inability of forces to enter from the north was disappointing,
but
- Keeping 4th ID in the Mediterranean created element of
surprise
- Iraq did not expect attack to begin until 4th ID arrived in
Kuwait
- Lessons Learned process began before the war did
- JFCOM team provided immediate feedback
- CENTCOM could apply “lessons” in real time & improve coalition
performance in this war
- 21st century overmatching power is more important than “overwhelming
force”
- Force used to be measured in terms of mass (numbers of troops)
- Now need advanced capabilities & use them in innovative &
unexpected ways
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- Jointness: a maturing of joint force operations
- From Southern/Northern Watch Ops
& OEF experiences
- Integration of ground maneuver, spec ops, precision lethal fires &
non-lethal effects
- Precision munitions: a force multiplier
- C2: unprecedented situational awareness
- Equipment readiness
- Training state of the troops
- Coalition support & “Strategic Anchors”
- “Cooperative Security” relationships paid high dividends in basing,
staging & over flight rights
- DoD/CIA synergy using integration of liaison officers facilitated
teamwork
- Worked well during OEF & paid great dividends in Iraq
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- Fratricide prevention
- Suffered from lack of standardized combat ID (7 systems)
- Commanders overcame shortcomings “on the fly”
- Deployment planning & execution cumbersome
- Need to improved to meet 21st C operational demands
- Coalition information sharing: must improve at all levels
- Human intelligence: requires continuing focus
- Comms bandwidth: requires continuing focus
- Global Hawk: hi-alt, long loiter, beyond line-of-sight multi-sensor UAV
will be further developed
- Need to include laser designation & precision weaponry delivery
- Integrated common operating picture (COP): very powerful but need
further development
- Tracking systems were previously Service-unique
- Workarounds developed, but need integrated, user-friendly, C4I
architecture for blue & red air, ground & maritime forces
- Strategic lift & tanker aircraft availability were stretched
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- C2 of air, ground, naval, & SOF from 7,000 mi. away: “unique
experience in warfare”
- Permitted unprecedented real time situational awareness &
connectivity
- Precision-guided munitions: a force multiplier
- Low collateral damage was fundamental factor to achieving objectives
- Armed Predator: demonstrated great potential
- will be a high payoff system in the future
- Blue Force Tracking/ enhanced C4I systems: increased lethality and
decreased response time
- Transformational technologies
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- There is much to be done – There are plenty of opportunities
- Spiral Development Requires testers to be integrated into the
development process
- Testing & Training capabilities & requirements are complimentary
- Reality - Less than 100% solutions are being fielded and iteratively
being upgraded – Need good test plans to minimize fielding risks.
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Notes
